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Brown: Does the Liability Insurer Have a Duty to Compromise?

NOTES
DOES THE LIABILITY INSURER HAVE A
DUTY TO COMPROMISE?
Most jurisdictions, including Florida, impose a duty upon liability
insurers to act in good faith in determining whether to accept offers
to settle claims asserted against their policyholders., Breach of this
duty may render the insurer liable for a judgment against its insured
that exceeds the limits of the insurance policy. This potential liability
beyond the policy limits stymies the insurer's inclination to proceed
with litigation when the claimant's offer to settle approaches the face
value of the policy. However, the policies underlying the rule, such
as discouragement of unwarranted litigation and protection of all
parties, are often thwarted by factors unrelated to the merits of the
cause. The duty to settle is enforced by an action against the insurer.
This note assumes a breach 2 by the insurer and focuses on the
problem of what party is the proper plaintiff to enforce the duty.
Potential plaintiffs generally fall into three classes: (1) an insured
who has paid or can pay the judgment in excess of the policy limits,
(2) an insolvent insured who cannot pay the judgment, and (3) the
tort claimant who has become the judgment creditor of an insolvent
insured.3 An insured who has paid the excess has consistently been
allowed to recover. 4 The insolvent insured has been both allowed
and denied recovery, 5 but the judgment creditor of the insolvent
insured has repeatedly been denied recognition.0
In a recent case, Sturgis v. Canal Ins. Co., 7 the Florida Supreme
Court adopted the view that a judgment creditor of an insured has
1. E.g., American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932);
Tully v. Travelers Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Fla. 1954); Canal Ins. Co. v.
Sturgis, 114 So. 2d 469 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959), afl'd, 122 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1960)
(dictum, quoted in text at note 11 infra).
2. As to whether the breach has, in fact, occurred, see Appleman, Conflicts in
Injury Defenses, 31 FLA. BAR J. 402 (1957), which contains an excellent discussion
with emphasis on the practical aspects.
3. The possibility of a judgment creditor of a financially responsible insured
seeking to enforce the claim is omitted because he would levy on the assets of the
insured rather than attempt another lawsuit. The possibility of an assignee of
the insured attempting to prosecute the claim is likewise omitted, because he
would be treated as standing in the shoes of the insured if the assignment were
upheld. Assignment of the claim is treated in the text at note 30 infra.
4. E.g., cases cited note 1 supra.
5. See cases cited notes 13, 14 infra.
6. See cases cited note 8 infra.
7. 122 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1960).
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no cause of action against the insurance company for a bad faith
failure to settle a claim against the insured. This holding is in accord
with the great majority of cases from other jurisdictions.3
The reported opinions 9 of the Sturgis case do not detail the facts
of the controversy, and one can only speculate as to why the judgment
creditor, rather than the insured, brought the action. 0 If the insured
was financially unable to sue or refused to enforce his claim against
the insurer, the policies underlying the duty to settle would appear
to have been undermined. When the tort victim is the plaintiff and
the insurance company's policyholder is insolvent, the insurer seemingly has a duty to compromise in a theoretical sense only. That this
duty may be theoretical rather than actual finds additional support
in a dictum from the First District Court of Appeal opinion in the
Sturgis case:"
"No one can today question the legal right of the insured to
sue the insurer for negligence or bad faith in failing to settle
a claim within the policy limits for, if he has had to pay a part
of the judgment, he has indeed suffered damages because of
such failure of the insurer .....
If this statement means that the insured must pay a portion of the
excess judgment before he can sue the insurer, the insurance company
has only a moral duty to settle when fortuitous circumstances provide
a judgment-proof policyholder.'? A number of jurisdictions have
held that payment of at least a portion of the excess judgment is a
8. Chittick v. State Farm. Mut., 170 F. Supp. 276 (D. Del. 1958); Wessing v.
American Indem. Co., 127 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. Mo. 1955); Francis v. Newton, 75
Ga. App. 341, 43 S.E.2d 282 (1947); Duncan v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 91
N.H. 349, 23 A.2d 325 (1941); Universal Auto. Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 126 Tex. 282,
86 S.W.2d 727, rehearing denied, 126 Tex. 282, 87 S.W.2d 475 (1935); Paul v.
Kirkendall, 6 Utah 2d 256, 311 P.2d 376 (1957); Murray v. Mossman, 355 P.2d 985
(Wash. 1960).
9. Sturgis v. Canal Ins. Co., 122 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1960) (deciding the question
certified from the 1st D.C.A.); Canal Ins. Co., v. Sturgis, 115 So. 2d 774 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1959) (certifying question to the Supreme Court); Canal Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 114
So. 2d 469 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1959) (deciding the question certified from the circuit

court).
10. The Sturgis case exemplifies the reasoning of the many cases denying the
existence of a cause of action to the insolvent insured's judgment creditor. See
cases cited note 8 supra.
11. 114 So. 2d at 471. (Emphasis added in second instance.)
12. This dictum from the Sturgis case exemplifies the reasoning of the cases
denying a cause of action to the insured who has a judgment in excess of the
policy limit outstanding against him, but is financially unable to pay even a
portion of it. See cases cited note 13 infra. Florida has taken no position on
whether the insolvent insured has a cause of action. See Dotschay ex rel. Alphonso
v. National Mut. Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1957).
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The salient feature stressed by the courts in many of these latter
cases is that the insolvency of the insured should not operate to create
a windfall for the insurance company. 15
Recognition of a cause of action in an insured who is unable to
pay the judgment in excess of the policy limit and denial of a cause
of action to his judgment creditor raise a perplexing problem. If the
insured is the only party with the prerogative of asserting this claim,
he is in a position to bargain with the company and his judgment
creditor. 16 This contingency may bestow a windfall on the insured at
the expense of both the insurer and the claimant. This factor
favors either allowing the insured's judgment creditor to sue the
company directly or not allowing the claim to be enforced by the
insured unless he has paid at least a portion of the judgment in excess
of the policy limit.'1 The latter holding results in a windfall to the

13. Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 184 F. Supp. 634 (D. Md. 1960) (expressly
following the dictum in State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, infra); Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 92 N.H. 140, 26 A.2d 361 (1942); Duncan v. Lumbermen's
Mut. Cas. Co., 91 N.H. 349, 23 A.2d 325 (1941); Universal Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Culberson, 126 Tex. 282, 86 S.W.2d 727 (1935), rehearing denied, 126 Tex. 282, 87
S.W.2d 475 (1935); State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir.
1939) (dictum).
14. Wessing v. American Indem. Co., 127 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. Mo. 1955); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 270 Ala. 119, 116 So. 2d 924
(1959); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 313 P.2d 404 (1957);
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Brown
v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957); Henke v. Iowa
Home Mut. Cas. Co., 250 Iowa 1123, 97 N.W.2d 168 (1959); Schwartz v. Norwich
Union Indem. Co., 212 Wis. 593, 250 N.W. 446 (1933); Alford v. Textile Ins. Co.,
248 N.C. 224, 229, 103 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1958) (dictum); Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1952); Murray v. Mossman, 355 P.2d
985, 987 (Wash. 1960) (dictum).
15. E.g., Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, supra note 14.
16. Half of this problem was observed in passing in Lee v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 184 F. Supp. 634, 642, n.6 (D. Md. 1960). The Court remarked that the
insured was put in a position to demand that his judgment creditor take less than
full payment in return for the insured's asserting his claim against the insurance
company. The other half of the problem is that the insured could request a
compromise sum from the company in return for his abstention from bringing
suit. In effect the insured can take bids. This problem is not entirely removed
by the claimant's ability to attach assets coming into the hands of the insured,
since the payment made by the insurance company would not pass through the
court. The Lee case also states that there is no way to insure that a judgment
rendered in favor of the judgment-proof insured will not be dissipated before
the judgment creditor can levy upon it.
17. And then only to the extent to which the insured is out of pocket? This
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insurance company,'1 while the former permits what some consider
to be an "anomalous" situation. 9
In reaching the decision in the Sturgis case the Supreme Court
distinguished an earlier Florida case, Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v.
20
which permitted the judgment creditor to recover the excess
Shaw,
amount directly from the insurance company. The insurance policy
2
involved in the Shaw case contained this provision: '
"The insolvency . . . of the Assured shall not release the
company from any payment otherwise due hereunder, and...
the judgment creditor shall have a right of action against the
Company... to the same extent that Assured would have had
if he had paid the judgment."
This clause was construed to make the policy a third party beneficiary
contract and to make the claimant a creditor beneficiary.
The insurance policy in the Sturgis case was distinguished on the
22
basis of the wording of a comparable clause:
"[Any person ... who has secured such judgment ...shall
thereafter be entitled to recover under this policy to the extent
of the insurance afforded by this policy."
This clause, it was held, did not give the judgment creditor any
rights against the company beyond the policy limit. "Insurance
afforded by this policy" was held not to include the duty of the
company to act in good faith in considering an offer to compromise
the claim against the insured. In view of the ambiguity of this
phrase, it could have been construed against the company that
authored the contract. The plaintiff in the Sturgis case contended
that the policy was a third party beneficiary contract. His argument
was predicated upon the public policy of Florida as expressed by the
legislature in Florida's Financial Responsibility Law.2 3 In the initial
seems circuitous, since then the claimant could levy on the judgment of the insured
against the company, which would give rise to another claim by the insured against
the company, etc. See Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 250 Iowa 1123, 97
N.W.2d 168 (1959).
18. See text at note 16 supra.
19. See Chittick v. State Farm Mut., 170 F. Supp. 276 (D. Del. 1958); Canal
Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 114 So. 2d 469, 471 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1959), as quoted at note
28 infra; R. E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67
HARV. L. REv. 1136, 1175 (1954).
20. 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938).
21. Id. at 821, 184 So. at 855. (Emphasis added.) A similar unique policy
provision was construed in the same way. Kleinschmit v. Farmers Mut. Hail Ins.,
101 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1939).
22. Canal Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, supra note 19, at 470. (Emphasis added.)
23. FLA. STAT. ch. 324 (1959).
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section the legislature makes it abundantly clear that its intent is to
24
provide compensation for injuries received on Florida's highways.
Although providing for sanctions against those who fail to compensate their victims,25 the legislature provides that the obtaining of
20
liability insurance is one of the ways to comply with the law. It
seems that the language of the insurance policy coupled with this
legislative expression of public policy should have been controlling.
This contention, however, apparently deserved no consideration, since
it was not mentioned in either the majority opinion of the district
court of appeal or the opinion of the Supreme Court. In a concurring opinion in the district court the argument was recognized, only
to be rejected as against the majority of holdings in other jurisdictions.27 Since the injured claimant is not a third party beneficiary of
the insurance contract, if the insurer can in some way assure itself
that the policyholder will not assert the claim, it is relieved of its duty
to settle.
Although the Court in Sturgis relied on the lack of privity of
contract between the insurance company and the judgment creditor
28
to deny recovery, it gave some weight to this additional reason:
"The judgment creditor has not suffered because of the insurer's
failure, but has, if anything, gained thereby. The judgment
creditor would be in an anomalous position, for typically he
would be claiming damages for the insurer's failure to settle
the case for much less than the verdict he himself actually
won."
The assertion that the judgment creditor has not suffered is questionable. He has been forced into prolonged litigation, with its attendant
mental stress, has incurred additional pecuniary expense, and has
weathered a time delay in receiving compensation. Also of doubtful
validity is the statement that it would be an anomaly to permit recovery for that which a claimant was willing to forego. In ordinary
two-party litigation it is not considered anomalous for a party to
recover an amount in excess of the amount for which he was willing
to settle. It should not be considered anomalous for the party who
decides not to settle to bear the risk of the excess judgment, at least
when bad faith in failing to settle can be demonstrated. It should be
noted that the cases that allow the insolvent insured to recover do
not mention the "anomaly," although it is obvious that the holder
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

FLA. STAT. §324.011 (1959).
FLA. STAT. §324.051. (1959).
FLA. STAT. §324.031 (1959).

Canal Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 114 So. 2d 469, 472 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
Id. at 471.
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of the unsatisfied judgment will be the ultimate beneficiary of a
29
recovery by the insured.
Two cases have allowed the judgment creditor of the insured to
sue the insurance company directly, after taking an assignment of
the insured's cause of action, for a bad faith or negligent failure to
compromise the claim.30 Ignoring the injustices that are likely to
result from the possibility that the insured may put his assignment
up for sale to the highest bidder,31 an otherwise impossible situation
for the claimant may be avoided if he can obtain an assignment from
the insured. In many cases the insured would be well advised to
assign his claim against the company to the tort victim in an effort
to avoid the constant threat of an outstanding judgment against him.
Florida case law is available to support such an assignment,
whether it is a claim "arising out of contract" 2 or denominated a
"tort."3 3 The dictum of one case 34 is broad enough to support an
assignment even if the claim is labeled a "personal tort." Survival
was the anciently recognized test for assignability of a cause of action,
and is apparently the recognized test in Florida. 35 The Florida "survival statute" permits the survival of all claims for or against a decedent. 3° Consequently, if survival is the test for assignability, it is
submitted that the court could sustain an assignment of the insured's
cause of action.
CONCLUSION

Must an insurance company settle in a proper case? Must the
29. E.g., Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 250 Iowa 1123, 97 N.W.2d 168

(1959).
80. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958);
Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
31. Problems arise similar to those suggested in note 16 supra and accompanying text.
82. Spears v. West Coast Builders' Supply Co., 101 Fla. 980, 133 So. 97 (1931)
(upholding assignment to a trustee in bankruptcy and assignment by trustee to
plaintiff of the right to foreclose a materialman's lien); Smith v. Westcott, 34
Fla. 430, 16 So. 332 (1894) (upholding assignment of claims for labor performed
and material furnished).
33. State Rd. Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d. 298 (1941) (upholding
assignment of right of action for removing gravel from grantee's land before
conveyance); Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So. 2d 311 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1960) (upholding assignment of right of action to a grantee against a utility for
suspending power lines over property conveyed after placing of wires).
84. Richardson v. Holman, 160 Fla. 65, 71, 33 So. 2d 641, 644 (1948): "Under
the common law a right of action, choses in action, future or contingent interests,
possible and existing estates or interests, were not assignable, but all of these are
now assignable by statute or in equity."
85. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co. v. Paul, 167 Fed. 784 (5th Cir. 1909) (applying
Florida law).
36. FLA. STAT. §45.11 (1959).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol14/iss1/3

6

